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ABSTRACT
This paper uses school choice data from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District to study parents’
preferences for school characteristics and their implications for demand and competition in school
choice. We estimate a mixed-logit demand model using the rankings of parents’ top three school
choices in the first year of school choice. Our results show that parents value proximity highly and
preferences for school test scores increase with student income and own academic ability. We also
find considerable heterogeneity in idiosyncratic preferences, with negative correlations between
preferences for academics and proximity. Unique aspects of the choice plan, such as the redrawing
of school boundaries, allow us to test for bias from endogenous residential location and strategic
choices. Simulations of parental responses to school test score improvements suggest that the
demand response at high-performing schools would be larger than at low-performing schools,























 I.   Introduction 
  
School choice plans are intended to improve both education quality and equity by 
providing demand-side incentives for schools to compete for students and by allowing 
broader access to quality public schools. Urban public school districts, such as those in 
Charlotte, Milwaukee and Washington DC, are currently experimenting with ways to 
promote greater competition, such as public school choice plans, charter school 
programs, and limited voucher plans. Moreover, the recent federal No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB) requires districts receiving federal Title I funds to allow students in failing 
schools to choose to attend non-failing schools outside of their neighborhood.  
However, theory suggests that the potential effect of expanded choice depends 
critically on the distribution of consumer preferences for product (school) characteristics 
(Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992)). For example, if parents care primarily about 
proximity and convenience, then schools may not face much pressure to improve under 
school choice. On the other hand, if parents choose schools primarily for academic 
achievement, then school choice may lead to intense pressure to improve education 
quality, leading to overall academic gains (‘a tide that lifts all boats’). Differences in 
preferences across socio-economic groups can also have important consequences. If high-
income families and parents of high-achieving students focus on academics when 
choosing schools, while low-income families focus on proximity or convenience, then 
schools may become more stratified under school choice. Strong academic schools may 
compete in a city-wide market for higher-achieving students while schools in low-income 
neighborhoods serve the remaining students, acting as ‘local monopolists’ with little 
pressure to improve.  
  The ultimate impact of greater parental choice depends upon the nature of 
parental preferences. However, econometric evidence on parental preferences and the 
effects of school choice on overall academic achievement is quite limited. In the absence 
of micro data with which to directly estimate the demand for schools, researchers in the 
related literature have been forced to make strong assumptions about the nature of 
demand and competition. For instance, researchers have recently focused on the 
relationship between measures of district ‘concentration’ (HHI) across metropolitan areas  
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and average student achievement (Borland and Howson (1992), Hoxby (2000), Hanushek 
and Rivkin (2003), Belfield and Levin (2002)). However, the relationship between the 
HHI and the degree of competition rests on certain assumptions regarding the nature of 
demand and market structure, namely that firms (here schools or districts) are symmetric 
and compete on quantity in a homogeneous goods market (Farrell and Shapiro (1990)). 
The results of this literature are mixed (Belfield and Levin (2002)), with significant 
positive, negative and insignificant relationships between measures of student 
achievement and measures of market concentration. Another related literature has taken a 
theoretical approach, using computable general equilibrium models to simulate the 
impact of stylized choice programs on student sorting and achievement (Nechyba (1999, 
2000, 2003), and Epple and Romano (1998, 2002)). These models allow for comparisons 
of alternative hypothetical choice programs, but must make assumptions regarding 
parental preferences with little empirical guidance.  
In this paper, we use a unique natural experiment in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
School district (CMS), in North Carolina, to estimate the distribution of preferences for 
key school characteristics. We use multiple ranked data from parents’ school choices for 
the first year of district-wide school choice to estimate a mixed-logit model of demand 
for schools, allowing preferences to vary idiosyncratically as well as with observed 
characteristics such as race, income, and baseline academic achievement. We find that 
preferences for measures of academic quality are increasing in income and student 
baseline achievement. We also find that parents highly value proximity, but that 
idiosyncratic preferences for measures of academic achievement and proximity are 
negatively correlated, implying that parents with strong preferences for academic 
achievement are willing to leave their local neighborhood to get it. We use these 
preference distributions to simulate the demand-side response to an increase in a school’s 
mean test score, all else equal. We find that higher performing schools compete for 
elastic students and experience a relatively high demand response to an incremental 
improvement in mean test scores. Lower performing schools, however, face little 
demand-side pressure to improve, serving mostly local, inelastic families. Such results 
suggest that public school choice may lead towards greater educational stratification of 
schools serving high and low income youth.   
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Several aspects of the Mecklenburg County choice plan make it ideal for 
estimating demand parameters. First, CMS introduced public school choice in the fall of 
2002, after a race-based bussing plan was terminated by court order. Under the choice 
plan, parents in the district were asked to submit their top three choices of schools for 
their children. Approximately 95% of the 110,000 students submitted choices for the 
choice plan. Thus we have data for nearly the entire student population—whereas most 
work using school choice data has been dependent on limited and potentially non-
representative subgroups of students. Second, the multiple responses create variation in 
the choice set by effectively removing the prior chosen school from the subsequent 
choice set. This choice-set variation allows us to estimate the distribution of preferences 
for school characteristics from observed substitution patterns for each individual – a 
stronger source of variation for identification than cross-sectional changes in the choice 
set based on geographic location (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004)). Third, historic 
placement of schools for busing in CMS provides wide variation in school characteristics 
for families in all socio-economic groups, dampening collinearity problems that may be 
present in other settings. 
Moreover, the introductory year of the school choice plan provides a unique 
opportunity to test for the importance of potentially confounding factors such as 
residential sorting and strategic behavior. First, the district redrew school boundaries 
when they implemented the school choice plan. As a result, approximately fifty percent 
of families lost property rights to the school they would have been guaranteed to attend 
the year before. This exogenous shock to residential sorting helps identify preferences for 
proximity from preferences for other school characteristics. Second, the redrawing of 
school boundaries allows us to test for the presence of strategic behavior. Had parents 
known the school assignment mechanism, some may have had an incentive to 
misrepresent their true preferences. Given the way slots in oversubscribed schools were 
allocated, those with weaker default schools would have had an incentive to “hedge” their 
first choices, by listing a less popular school first (Glazerman and Meyer (1994), 
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003)). We test whether choices were different for those 
reassigned to stronger and weaker schools.  We find little evidence of such strategizing in 
the first year of the program, although participants could develop such strategic behavior  
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as they become more familiar with the choice system and they learn more about which 
choices will be oversubscribed (Roth and Erev (1995), Kagel and Roth(2000)).  
In the absence of public school choice, residential location alone determines 
school assignment. Public school choice advocates argue that competition on the basis of 
residential location alone may be not be enough to spur schools to focus on student 
achievement, since parental responses are muted by budget constraints and desires for 
other neighborhood attributes. Our results measure the additional competitive pressure 
created by a public school choice plan when school assignments are decoupled from 
residential location. Our analysis points to heterogeneous preferences in a differentiated 
schools (products) market and the resulting market segmentation as key factors limiting 
competition among schools even after geographic-based constraints are lifted. 
 
II.  Previous Literature on School Choice and Competition 
 
In recent years, a number of papers have estimated the impact of market 
“concentration” in local public schools on educational outcomes. (Borland and Howson 
(1992), Hoxby (2000), Hanushek and Rivkin (2003)). Belfield and Levin (2002) provide 
a thorough review of this extensive literature. Without micro data with which to directly 
estimate demand for schools, researchers often assume that competition in the schooling 
market in a metropolitan area can be measured by an HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 
of districts. The higher the concentration of districts, the lower the extent of competition, 
and the lower the pressure to improve academically should be. However, the relationship 
between HHI and competition is derived mechanically from the equilibrium price-cost 
margins in an n-firm symmetric Cournot model of competition (Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990)). The use of the HHI itself takes as a premise certain assumptions on product 
differentiation and preferences.
 1 Therefore, such studies provide no test for differential 
demand-side pressures across schools serving different socio-economic classes. Neither 
                                                 
1 Recognizing that, outside of the symmetric firm Cournot model, the HHI is no longer a sufficient statistic 
for competition, the recent literature in industrial organization has focused on estimating underlying 
preference parameters of consumer’s indirect utility to understand demand, substitution patterns, and nature 
of competition between firms in differentiated products markets. In our context, estimates of preference 
parameters will yield estimates of the demand response faced by individual schools, allowing insights into 
the nature of competitive pressure on quality and student sorting under school choice.  
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can such studies shed light on student sorting (which types of students will pick which 
schools), test which schools compete for which students, or elucidate effective supply-
side policy to increase demand-elasticity or improve educational equity. The results of 
this literature are mixed, with negative, positive, and insignificant relationships between 
HHI’s and educational outcomes (Belfield & Levin (2002), Table 1). 
Other researchers have explored theoretical models of student sorting and 
equilibrium outcomes under various forms of voucher plans (Nechyba (1999, 2000, 
2003), and Epple and Romano (1998, 2002)).
2 The general equilibrium approach has the 
benefit of being able to compare alternative, hypothetical school choice and voucher 
plans with various funding, admissions, or targeting rules. However, instead of 
uncovering parental preferences, these models place theoretical assumptions on parental 
choice behavior in order to compute equilibrium outcomes.  For instance, they often 
assume that preferences are homogeneous or that parents care only about test 
performance and peer characteristics (and not proximity). In this paper, we will not be 
able to compare equilibrium outcomes across alternative school choice mechanisms; 
however we use a large-scale public school choice experiment and parents’ actual choices 
to uncover preference distributions for school characteristics. The estimates of demand 
parameters presented in this paper, therefore, should be helpful to future efforts to 
calculate equilibrium outcomes under alternative school choice mechanisms. 
Another set of research papers have focused on survey analysis, studying what 
parents say they look for when choosing schools. Parents generally state that academic 
achievement and teacher quality are the most important school characteristics (Armor and 
Peiser (1998), Vanourek et al. (1998), Greene et al. (1998), Kleitz et al. (2000), Schneider 
et al. (1998)). However, inferring parents’ preferences from survey responses may not 
give an accurate estimate of parents’ true preferences. For example, parents’ stated 
preferences may be altered to fit social norms – emphasizing a high value for education 
quality, a low value for convenience, and potentially downplaying concerns for school 
racial composition.
3 Furthermore, when responding to hypothetical questions, parents 
                                                 
2 See Neal (2002) for a summary of the results from this literature. 
3 For example, survey research in Political Science often asks people about their voting history. Voting 
history is verifiable using publicly available voting records. Researchers systematically find that a large  
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may make assumptions that affect their responses in ways not apparent to the researcher 
(e.g. automatically incorporating the importance of proximity in their response and 
implicitly limiting their choice set to nearby schools). 
A smaller set of studies have exploited the actual choices parents make to infer 
parental preferences.
4 Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2003) use actual household location 
decisions from the US Census to estimate household preferences over a broad range of 
housing, neighborhood and school characteristics. They find evidence of differences in 
preferences for neighborhood attributes across observable characteristics. These studies 
must rely on cross-sectional residential location data to infer preferences for many 
different neighborhood, school, and life-style characteristics. Glazerman (1997), using a 
conditional logit framework and data from a limited choice program in Minneapolis, 
found that while test scores mattered in driving parental choices, parents tended to avoid 
schools in which their children’s racial group represented less than 20 percent of all 
students. However, the Minneapolis choice plan was a long-standing program that 
involved only a small percentage of parents with very limited school options, and a 
history of incentives and participation that may have affected parents stated choices.  
In summary, the CMS school choice plan provides a unique opportunity to 
examine preferences across the population of students at the introduction of a school 
choice program. The policy experiment and multiple ranked choice data will allow us to 
overcome hurdles of strategy and residential sorting, and use a more flexible mixed-logit 
discrete choice framework to estimate both observable and unobservable heterogeneity in 
preferences (Hausman and Wise (1978) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, 2004)). 
We can then use the distribution of preferences to simulate the implications for demand-
side pressures to improve academic achievement in public school choice.  
 
III.  Details of Public School Choice Plan in CMS 
 
Before the introduction of a school choice plan in the fall of 2002, the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg public school district (CMS) operated under a racial desegregation order for 
                                                                                                                                                 
fraction of respondents claim that they have voted when in fact they have not. It appears they may do so to 
conform to social norms (Karp and Brockington (2005)).  
4 See Manski and Wise (1983) for an early application to college choice.  
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three decades. In September 2001, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the 
school district “unitary” and ordered the district to dismantle the race-based student 
assignment plan by the beginning of the next school year. In December of 2001, the 
school board voted to approve a new district-wide public school choice plan. 
   In the spring of 2002, parents were asked to submit their top three choices of 
school programs for each child. Each student was assigned a “home school” in their 
neighborhood, often the closest school to them, and was guaranteed a seat at this school. 
Magnet students were similarly guaranteed admission to continue in their current magnet 
programs. Admission for all other students was limited by grade-specific capacity limits 
set by the district. Students could choose any school in the district, however, busing 
transportation was only guaranteed to schools in a student’s quadrant of the district (the 
district was split into 4 quadrants called ‘choice zones’). The district allowed significant 
increases in school enrollment size in the first year of the school choice program in an 
expressed effort to give each child one of their top three choices. In the spring of 2002, 
the district received choice applications for approximately 105,000 of 110,000 students. 
Approximately 95% of parents received admission to one of their top three choices. 
Admission to over-subscribed schools was determined by a lottery system as described 
below.  
 
Potential for Strategic Choice 
The lottery mechanism used by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools was a ‘first-
choice-maximizer,’ in which slots were first assigned to all those listing a given school as 
a first choice before moving to those listing the school as a second or third choice. In 
such a mechanism, parents with poor home school options may have an incentive to 
misstate their preferences – not listing their most preferred school if it had a low 
probability of admission (Glazerman and Meyer (1994), Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 
(2003), Abdulkadiroglu et. al (2006)). Instead, they may have hedged their bets by listing 
a less preferred option with a higher probability of admission in order to avoid being 
assigned to their home school. Such strategic behavior would imply that student choices 
would not reflect true preference orderings for schools—to the extent that students are 
not listing their preferred match due to strategic hedging on quality.   
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However, there were a number of reasons why such strategic behavior was 
unlikely to have been a major concern in the 2002-2003 CMS choice plan. First, parents 
did not know how the lottery system would be operated. The handful of district officials 
who knew the lottery details were not allowed to communicate them to parents. Parents 
were never given their actual lottery numbers. The district also told parents that they 
would make every attempt to give each student admission to one of their chosen schools, 
and instructed them to list what they wanted. In order to accommodate demand, the 
district substantially expanded capacity at popular schools. In addition, the district gave a 
‘priority boost’ to low-income students choosing to attend schools with low 
concentrations of low income students. Hence, choices for top schools by students with 
under-performing home schools would be given top priority. This would counteract the 
incentive for these students to hedge their choices as outlined above.  
In addition to these strong a priori reasons to suspect that strategy did not play a 
large role in determining parents’ choices in this first year of school choice, we use the 
redistricting to test if parents with exogenous changes to the quality of their home school 
had lower preferences for high-quality schools as would be predicted if parents were 
behaving strategically. We present this test in Section VII along with other robustness 
checks. Perhaps because of the uncertainty about the mechanism and the newness of the 
system, we do not find evidence that strategic behavior played a significant role in this 
first year of school choice. 
5  
 
Redistricting with the Choice Plan 
Because the public school choice plan replaced a busing plan for racial 
integration, school assignment zones, which often paired non-contiguous black and white 
neighborhoods, were dramatically redrawn. Under the choice plan, 43 percent of parcels 
were assigned to a different elementary grade ‘home school’ than they were assigned to 
the year before under the busing system. At the middle school and high school levels this 
number was 52 and 35 percent respectively. Therefore, in our analysis, the home school 
                                                 
5 In subsequent years of school choice, when capacities at schools were no longer changed to accommodate 
demand, strategy may have become more important. In the second year of choice, CMS no longer made an 
effort to accommodate choices by changing school capacities. Many parents received none of their three 
choices, and expressed frustration because they had made choices without knowing the probability of 
admittance.  
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for many students is often not the school they would have been assigned at the time they 
chose their residence. This dramatic change in school assignment zones implies that 
residential location was less likely to reflect endogenous sorting based on family 
preferences for a nearby school.  
 
Heterogeneous Choices  
Interestingly, there was little unanimity in parents’ choice of schools. Certainly, 
much of the variance in parents’ top choices is driven by differences in travel times to a 
given set of schools. But, even among parents with the same elementary home school 
assignment for 2002-03, parents on average listed on average 10.4 different first-choice 
elementary schools.
6 Such a diversity of choices suggests that there is a considerable 
heterogeneity in preferences, making the mixed-logit demand estimation approach 
important for understanding demand-side pressure to improve academic achievement in a 
public school choice setting. 
 
IV.  Data Description and Empirical Specification 
 
Data 
We have secure access to administrative data for all students in CMS for the year 
before and after the implementation of school choice. Throughout the analysis, we focus 
on students entering grades 4 through 8. We focus on this student segment for two 
reasons. First, younger students do not have baseline standardized test scores. Since we 
wanted to study the relationship between baseline test scores and parental preferences, 
and the implications for student sorting in school choice, we focus on students entering 
fourth grade or higher. Second, we do not consider high school students since high school 
choice is likely influenced by factors such as graduation rates and athletic programs that 
are not central to elementary and middle school choices, and thus would be better 
handled in a separate analysis.  
For each student, we have the choice forms submitted to CMS, allowing a student 
to specify up to 3 choices for their school. In addition to the student choices our data 
                                                 
6 This number accounts for differences in choices listed driven by differences in the prior-year’s school.  
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contain student characteristics for the years before and after school choice, including 
geocoded residential location, race, gender, lunch-subsidy recipient status, and student 
test scores for standardized North Carolina End of Grade Exams in math and reading, and 
school assignment. We use these data to construct key covariates in the demand for 
schools such as driving distance from each student to each school, an indicator for busing 
availability, an indicator for the prior year’s school, measures of student-level income, 
student baseline academic achievement, school-level academic achievement, and school-
level racial composition. The variables used in our model and are described in detail in 
Section VI and in Table II.  
 
Empirical Model 
Our empirical model uses the parental choices, along with data on each student 
and school choices, to estimate preferences for school characteristics and how they vary 
in the population. We estimate a mixed logit discrete choice demand model (McFadden 
and Train 2000, Train 2003). Mixed logits are multinomial logit choice models with 
random coefficients on product attributes in the indirect utility function. The mixed logit 
can approximate any random utility model, given appropriate mixing distributions and 
explanatory variables (Dagsvik (1994), McFadden and Train (2000)). Standard 
multinomial logit models impose the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption, which implies that, when choice sets are altered (for example by the 
introduction of a new school), substitution to any new school does not depend on its 
similarity to existing schools. In contrast, by introducing individual heterogeneity in 
preferences over product attributes, the mixed logit model allows for more flexible 
substitution patterns – generating credible estimates of demand elasticities and 
simulations, which are key to understanding implications of school choice for 
competition on quality.  
 This flexibility, however, comes at some cost. Because of the more complicated 
functional form, the likelihood function for the mixed logit does not have a closed form, 
and must be estimated by numerically integrating over the distribution for the random 
parameters. In addition, changes in the choice set generated by multiple choice data are  
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often needed to identify the mean and variance of the preference parameters (Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004)). The CMS data provide this important source of variation.  
Our model is based on a standard random utility framework. Let Uij be the 
expected utility of individual i from attending school j. Individual i chooses the school j 
that maximizes his or her utility over all possible schools in the choice set. For the first 
choice, the individual chooses over the set of all available schools (denoted 
1
i J ), so that: 
1
1 = ij y  iff 
1
i ik ij J k U U ∈ ∀ >   
0
1 = ij y  otherwise. 
The second and third choice (identified by 
2
ij y  and 
3
ij y ) is made in a similar manner, 
except that the choice sets (denoted 
2
i J  and 
3
i J ) exclude schools already chosen by 
individual i. 
We assume that utility is a linear function of the observed student and school 
characteristics,  ij X , such as distance from home, average test scores, and racial 
composition of the school, plus an unobserved component, ij ε , that reflects unobserved 
idiosyncratic preference of student i for school j.  
(1)  ij i ij ij X U ε β + =  
We assume that the unobservable component ( ij ε ) is distributed i.i.d. extreme value, 
which yields the usual logit form for the choice probabilities conditional on  i β . 
Heterogeneity in individual preferences implies that the coefficients, i β , in 
equation (1) will vary across individuals. We allow for this heterogeneity in three ways. 
First, we allow the parameters of equation (1) to vary randomly across individuals. We 
assume that  ( ) θ μ β β β , | ~ f , where  ( ) f ⋅  is a multivariate normal mixing distribution, 
where μ  denotes the mean vector, and θ represents the variance matrix. Second, we 
separately estimate parameter distributions for students in each of the four main 
demographic categories: white and African American by lunch subsidy status. This 
allows us to compare means and variances of preferences for school characteristics across 
the different socio-economic groups. Third, we allow the coefficient on a school’s 
standardized score to vary with a student’s baseline test score and family income by  
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including interactions between these student characteristics and the school mean test 
score in the vector of characteristics, X. 
In the specifications that are reported below, we assume that all random 
parameters are drawn from a joint normal or log normal distribution. We allow for a 
covariance between preferences for proximity and school mean test score, since these are 
key dimensions of product differentiation that might effect competition on academic 
achievement. Other preference parameters are assumed to be independently distributed.
7  
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The term inside the integrand represents the probability of observing the three 
ranked choices conditional on the preference coefficients (β): this is the product of three 
logit probabilities evaluated at  i β , corresponding to the probability of making each 
choice from among the remaining options.
8 This conditional probability is integrated over 
the distribution of β  to yield the unconditional probability of observing the ranked 
choices.  
These probabilities form the log-likelihood function: 















, , ln , , θ μ   
Since equations (2) and (3) do not have a closed form solution, simulation methods were 
used to generate draws of β  from  ( ) f ⋅  to numerically integrate over the distribution of 
preferences. Estimation was by the method of maximum simulated likelihood, using 100 
                                                 
7 Allowing for general covariance structure across all parameters led to instability in the estimated 
covariance terms in some specifications, but did not significantly affect the remaining parameters or the 
substantive results that we report. 
8 For students submitting fewer than three choices, the likelihood is modified in an obvious way to reflect 
only the probability of the submitted choices. 
(2)  
  13
draws of β  from  () f ⋅  for each individual in the data set. The results were not sensitive 
to increasing the number of draws used. 
 
V.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
The CMS choice form allowed parents to list up to three school choices. The 
availability of more than one choice for students in CMS helps in the identification of the 
preference parameters. Intuitively, when only a single (1
st) choice is observed for every 
individual, it is difficult to be sure whether an unexpected choice was the result of an 
unusual error term ( ij ε ) or unusual preferences by the individual ( i β ) for some aspect of 
the choice. However, when an individual makes multiple choices that share a common 
attribute (e.g. high test scores) we can infer that the individual has a strong preference for 
that attribute, because independence of the additive error terms across choices would 
make observing such an event very unlikely in the absence of a strong preference. When 
we take away the first choice and ask parents which school they would like for their child 
instead, the researcher can observe in which direction parents substitute, and infer 
something about their preferences for school characteristics.  
Table I provides summary statistics on all of the students who submitted choice 
forms for the entire sample, broken down by race and lunch subsidy status. Overall, 95% 
of students submitted choice response forms. Whites and Blacks each comprise just over 
43% of the school population. Approximately 10 percent of white students receive 
federal lunch subsidies, while just over 60 percent of African Americans do. Since 
parents were guaranteed a slot in their default school, many parents listed only one or two 
schools on their choice forms. In particular, students who were white and ineligible for 
lunch subsidies were more likely to fill out only a first choice. Table I shows that the 
average scores for their home schools were one quarter to one half of a standard deviation 
higher than those of other groups. Between 46% and 63% of parents in the remaining 
subgroups submitted all three choices. Note that 20-46% parents who listed their home 
school first, listed subsequent choices. For instance, 42% of non-white students who were 
not receiving federal lunch subsidies chose their home school first, while only 28% listed  
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only a first choice. Whatever their reasons for doing so, the availability of multiple 
choices from those who listed their home school first will further aid in the identification 
of the preference parameters. 
Table I also provides the mean and standard deviation of baseline test scores of 
students in CMS in Spring 2002 by race and lunch-subsidy status. Student-level test 
scores are reported as the standardized score – standardized by the mean and standard 
deviation in the district for students in each grade. Hence, a value of zero implies students 
who scored the average relative to all other students in their grade in the district. While 
there are large differences in average test scores across the groups of students, there is 
substantial variation in student ability within each category as measured by performance 
on standardized tests. Similarly, the within-school and within-neighborhood variation is 
greater than across-school or across-neighborhood variation in student achievement. Such 
variation in student level-baseline achievement within and across schools, 
neighborhoods, and socio-economic groups will help identify the degree to which 
preferences for school quality vary with own academic ability. 
Finally, because schools had historically been placed for the busing for integration 
program, high-scoring schools (some of them magnet programs) are dispersed throughout 
the county, located in both urban and suburban areas, and in both minority and non-
minority communities. Table I reports the average travel distance (in miles) to the nearest 
school in the top quartile of average test scores. The average student in all four categories 
lives within 2-3 miles of a top-quartile school. Figure 1a presents a map of school 
locations and their test scores against the demographic characteristics of census block 
groups in Mecklenburg County (measuring approximately 22 miles across and 30 miles 
north to south), while Figure 1b shows an up-close example for a particular set of 
neighborhoods measuring roughly 4.5 miles across. Darker shading identifies block 
groups where more of the population is African American and identifies schools with 
higher average test scores. Note that many neighborhoods are racially integrated – with at 
least 20% of either race present. Neighborhoods that vary greatly in their racial 
composition are roughly the same distance to the same set of schools, and students in 
most neighborhoods can choose from schools with a wide range of average test scores.  
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Such variation will help us identify preferences for school proximity and school quality 
across the socio-economic groups of interest. 
 
VI. Results   
 
  The mixed logit model was estimated separately by race (white vs. non-white) 
and by receipt of federal lunch subsidies. Therefore, all estimates for both the means and 
variance-covariance matrices of the preference parameters were allowed vary across race 
and lunch-subsidy status. Within race and lunch-subsidy status, we included as 
explanatory variables measures of school and student characteristics that are central to 
understanding competition on quality in the context of the school choice debate. To 
capture the importance of proximity and travel costs, the specification included driving 
distance (in miles) from the student’s residence to the school (measured in miles), an 
indicator if busing was provided for the student to the school (the school was in the 
student’s zone), and an indicator if the school is the student’s neighborhood school. An 
indicator if the student attended the school in the prior year was included to capture the 
importance of continuity for students who were continuing in elementary or middle 
school. To capture the academic quality of the school, we calculate the average 2002 
standardized test score for students attending the school in 2003 (Cullen, Jacob, Levitt 
(2006)). We interacted the school’s average test score with the student’s standardized 
baseline test score (standardized by grade level across the district) and the median 
household income in the student’s neighborhood for the student’s race (measured in 
$1000’s, using their census block group in 2000, and de-meaned with the countywide 
median of $51,000). These interactions allowed the effect of school test scores on school 
choice to vary with a student’s income and academic ability. Finally, to capture the racial 
composition of a school, we included the percent black in the school in Spring 2003 and 
its square. When the quadratic term has a negative coefficient, this specification yields an 
implied bliss point (where the quadratic peaks) for preferences over racial mix of a 
school. 
The final estimation sample includes 36,816 students entering grades 4-8. The 
means and standard deviations of these variables across the over 2 million school choice  
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and student choice interactions available to our sample of students and schools are 
reported in Table III. The mixed logit parameter estimates are reported in Table IV. All 
of the point estimates were precisely estimated and statistically different from zero at less 
than the 1 percent level. To preserve space, the standard errors of the estimates of the 
preference distribution means and standard deviations are reported in Appendix Table I.  
 
Proximity: Travel Distance, Neighborhood Schools, and Bussing Zones 
  Given strong priors that the coefficient on distance would be non-positive, we 
imposed a lognormal distribution on the preference coefficient for distance: 
) exp(α β − = dist , where α was assumed to be normally distributed. In the table we report 
the mean and standard deviation for the actual coefficient ( dist β ) rather than for the 
underlying normal (α). The negative weight placed on distance is fairly uniform across 
the four demographic groups. However the effect of distance is slightly larger in absolute 
value for white students compared to black students, and slightly more variable for 
students receiving lunch subsidies. For an average student, each additional mile of 
distance reduces the odds of choosing a school by roughly 35% among whites and 27% 
among nonwhites. The standard deviation in this effect across students is 15%-30% of the 
mean, implying that for some students distance is a major barrier to choice while other 
students place very little weight on distance.  
  Preferences for home school are strong on average across all demographic groups; 
however there is also a large variance in the strength of the home-school preference 
within each group. The pattern for home school preference is similar to that found for 
distance: The mean preference for a home school is somewhat larger for whites, and 
somewhat more variable for students eligible for lunch subsidies. The mean effect is 
roughly equivalent to 5-7 miles in travel distance in each sub-sample of students. 
Because the home school is often the closest school to the student, this variable 
may pick up a non-linearity in preferences for proximity (parents have an added 
preference for the closest school to them). However, it may also represent a preference 
for a “neighborhood school,” where there may be social or informational benefits to 
attending the same school as other kids in the immediate neighborhood. We investigated 
the degree to which the estimated preference for a home school reflects a non-linear  
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preference for proximity versus a value of neighborhood school by re-estimating the 
model on a sample of students living along newly-created home-school boundary borders 
that bisected old school assignment zones. To the extent that these students had attended 
the same schools in the prior year, and faced a similar distance to all schools, we hoped to 
better isolate the importance of the home school designation. The preference for a home 
school was lower for students living on the boundary of a home school zone, but still 
positive and significant. Hence there appears to be a preference for the neighborhood 
school in addition to a non-linear component of preference for proximity.  
Another possibility is that the home school indicator is picking up a default effect, 
rather than a preference for neighborhood school. If parents do not want to invest the time 
to fully consider all the schools in the choice set, they may simply list their guaranteed 
school as their first choice.
9 This would imply a stronger preference for a home school on 
the first of the three choices. We estimated the mixed logit model with a separate 
coefficient on the home school indicator for just the first choice. Default behavior as 
described above should imply a positive coefficient on the home school indicator 
interacted with first choice. We found that the coefficient was smaller, and within one 
half of one standard deviation of the mean overall preference distribution for a home 
school. Hence, we interpret the coefficient on the home school indicator as picking up a 
preference for the ‘neighborhood school’ instead of picking up a default behavior.   
Finally, the coefficient on a school being in a student’s choice zone was intended 
to capture lower travel costs to these schools, since transportation by the district was only 
provided to schools within a student’s own choice zone. All four demographic groups 
have a strong mean preference for schools in their choice zone, with the effect being 
largest among students who are eligible for lunch subsidies (as would be expected if these 
students had limited access to alternative transportation). The standard deviation of the 
coefficient on choice zone is of roughly the same size as the mean in each demographic 
group, suggesting considerable variation across students in these preferences. 
Overall, the estimates for travel distance, neighborhood schools, and choice zones 
support the same general conclusion. While there are some differences across 
                                                 
9 Note this is different than defaulting by not turning in a choice form. Recall that 95% of parents submitted 
the choice forms. Of these, defaulting behavior might be an over-propensity to list Home School first, and 
nothing else.   
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demographic groups, it is clear that proximity is an important determinant of school 
choice for the average student. At the same time, there appears to be great heterogeneity 
across students in the weight that they place on proximity in choosing a school. 
 
School Test Scores 
  Given our prior that preferences for school scores would vary with student 
baseline academic ability as well as student income level even within race and lunch-
subsidy status, we included school test scores and their interaction with the student’s 
baseline test score and neighborhood income level. For students who are eligible for 
lunch subsidies, we did not include the interaction with neighborhood income because all 
of these students are presumably very low income.
10 Both neighborhood income and the 
student’s baseline score are “de-meaned”, so that the coefficient on the main effect of 
school score measures the value of school test score for a student with average income 
and baseline test score (both equal to zero). The coefficient on the main effect (the school 
test score) was treated as a random parameter, allowing for additional variation in 
preferences for school scores (beyond that explained by income and baseline test score). 
These estimates yield a number of interesting findings. For an average student, the 
mean preference for school scores is larger for non-white students within lunch-subsidy 
status, but students not eligible for lunch subsidies value school scores much more than 
their lunch-eligible peers. The difference between those who were receiving lunch 
subsidies and those who were not is consistent with the coefficient on the interaction with 
neighborhood income. Higher neighborhood income was strongly associated with higher 
mean preference for school scores, with a similar effect for both whites and non-whites. 
The difference in the mean preference between students receiving lunch subsidies and 
students not receiving lunch subsidies (about 1.0 within each race group) is roughly what 
would be predicted by a $70 thousand dollar income difference (based on the coefficient 
from the income interaction), which is roughly the right order of magnitude for the 
income difference between these groups.  
                                                 
10 In initial specifications using a conditional logit, income interactions with the preference for school scores were 
insignificant for the lunch-recipient segments.  
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The mean preference for school scores is also increasing in the student’s baseline 
test score. The coefficient on the interaction between the standardized value of one’s own 
test score and the school mean test score is positive. The coefficient varies somewhat 
across groups (with white free-lunch students having the smallest coefficient), but there is 
no obvious pattern by race or free-lunch status. The effect of a student’s baseline score on 
the preference for school test scores is similar in magnitude to the effect of income: A 
one standard deviation increase in the baseline test score is associated with a 0.29-0.46 
increase in the mean preference for school test scores, while a one standard deviation 
increase in neighborhood income (about $27,000) is associated with a 0.37-0.39 increase 
in the mean preference for school test scores. 
While the mean preferences for school test scores appear to be somewhat stronger 
for non-whites the heterogeneity in preferences within racial groups is considerable. 
Differences in baseline test scores and income each generate a standard deviation in 
preferences of roughly 0.3-0.4 based on the calculations from the previous paragraph. In 
addition, the variance on the coefficient for the main effect of school test scores is also 
estimated to vary with a standard deviation ranging from 0.3 to 0.7. Taken together, the 
total variation in preferences for school test scores across individuals is substantial.   
 
Covariance in Preference Trade-offs Between Proximity and School Scores  
  For a student with average preferences, the preference for proximity is very large 
relative to the preference for school test scores. For example, an average student with 
average preferences who was not receiving lunch subsidies would choose their home 
school over a school three miles further away in which average test scores were 1-2 
standard deviations higher, ceteris paribus. For the average student receiving lunch 
subsidies, the difference in school test scores would have to be even larger to induce them 
to switch. However, there is a large variance in preferences for school test scores, and the 
idiosyncratic preference for school test scores is negatively correlated with the preference 
for the home school across all of the four demographic groups, with particularly strong 
correlations amongst African-Americans who do not receive lunch subsidies. This 
implies that, while many students are very inelastic with respect to school test scores, 
there is a significant density of students who highly value school scores and have low  
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preferences for their neighborhood school. These students are willing to consider schools 
outside of their neighborhood, and they place a high weight on average test scores when 
picking a school.  
  Taken together, these estimates for the distribution of preferences for distance, 
home school, and school mean test score imply that there tend to be two types of parents: 
i) those who highly value proximity through their neighborhood school and are not likely 
to choose another school without substantial improvements to average school scores, and 
ii) those who place little value on proximity through their neighborhood school and place 
a large value on school scores. The first type of parent is highly inelastic to school quality 
as approximated by average test scores. Student of this type of parent will be served by 
their local school, and will stay with that local school even in the face of potentially large 
losses to relative school quality. The second type of parent is very elastic with respect to 
school quality - willing to travel over a relatively broad geography for a modest gain in 
school scores.
11 These underlying characteristics of the preference distribution have 
important implications for demand-side pressure for competition on school quality which 
we will discuss further in Section VIII.  
 
Racial Composition 
  While student preferences for school racial composition are not the focus of this 
paper, we must account for racial composition since it is correlated with average test 
scores of the school. To capture the racial composition of a school, we included the 
percent black in the school and its square. When the quadratic term has a negative 
coefficient (which was always the case), this specification can be interpreted in terms of 
an implied bliss point (where the quadratic peaks) for preferences over racial mix of a 
school, and a quadratic loss function for differences from this bliss point.  In Table IV, 
we report the estimates for the linear and quadratic terms, along with the implied bliss 
point. We allowed for a random coefficient on the linear term but not the squared term, 
which is equivalent to allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the bliss point but not the 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, casual interviews of parents in CMS revealed this same pattern. Parents either seemed to 
choose their neighborhood school with out much knowledge of other schools in the district, or parents 
seemed to know a lot about academic outcomes for many schools in the district, and based on that, tended 
to select a preferred school that was typically not their neighborhood school.  
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quadratic loss around that bliss point. Other specifications, such as dummies for ranges of 
percent black or a spline in percent black, yielded similar results. 
Not surprisingly, there were large differences between the races in their valuation 
of a school’s racial composition (and little difference by lunch-subsidy status). The mean 
bliss point for whites was around 30% black, while the mean bliss point for non-whites 
was around 80% black. Thus, the average preferred school for each racial group was one 
in which 70%-80% of the school was their own race. The quadratic term was negative for 
all demographic groups, but was larger for whites than non-whites, and larger for free-
lunch ineligible than for eligible. These results are quite consistent with an earlier 
literature highlighting racial differences in stated preferences regarding the racial 
composition of neighborhoods. In that literature (surveyed in Armor (1995)), whites 
preferred neighborhoods that were 10 to 30 percent black and blacks preferred 
neighborhoods that were roughly 50 percent black.  
  The focus of this current paper is on preferences for school quality rather than 
preferences for racial composition. Given the history of bussing for integration in CMS, 
and the higher-than average private school attendance of whites in the district, it is not 
clear that these racial preference estimates generalize outside of settings similar to this 
one.
12 However, because school test score is negatively correlated with the percent black 
in the school (with a correlation coefficient of approximately -.67), failing to deal with 
explicit racial preferences would lead us to understate black student valuation of school 
scores since they prefer schools with above-average black enrollment. Failing to account 
for school racial composition would have led to the false conclusion that whites care 
much more about school scores than black students.  
 
VII. Robustness Checks 
 
  There are a number of reasons that the estimates in Table IV may not accurately 
represent student preferences. In this section we present a series of robustness checks that 
address three particularly important concerns that could lead our estimates to understate 
                                                 
12 Approximately 12-15% of students attend private schools in CMS compared with 8-9% in the state of 
North Carolina, and 9-10% in the U.S as a whole.  
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the strength of preferences for academic quality at a school. These specification checks 
do not find evidence that the preference estimates in Table IV are biased by any of these 
three important concerns. 
 
Alternative Measures of Academic Quality 
In Table IV, we used average base-year (2002) test scores among students 
attending the school in 2003 as a measure of academic performance that influences 
parents’ choices. However, if this is a crude or incorrect proxy for the information 
available to parents, then our estimates may understate the extent to which parents care 
about academic performance in choosing a school. Table V presents mixed logit results 
for our original measure plus three alternative measures of school academic performance. 
To preserve space, we only report the coefficients on the measure of school academic 
performance (and its interactions with income and student baseline score), along with the 
log likelihood for each model as an indicator of overall fit. The first panel replicates our 
baseline specification. This specification assumes that parents correctly forecasted which 
students would choose each school, and used these students’ scores from the prior year as 
an indicator of how good the school would be in terms of academics. The second panel 
uses the average score in 2003 of the students in the school in 2003. This measure implies 
that parents correctly foresaw student sorting and outcomes and made their choices based 
on that. The third panel uses the 2002 average scores for students in each school in 2002. 
This measure implies that parents used historical student assignment and outcomes as the 
best indicator of future school performance. The final panel uses a “value-added” 
measure of each school’s impact on academic achievement in the prior year. We 
estimated each school’s “value-added” by regressing a student’s test score performance 
in 2003 on math and reading performance in the prior year, demographic characteristics, 
grade fixed effects, and fixed effects for each school.  The fixed effect estimated for each 
school represents our estimate of a school’s average impact on student performance. 
The results in Table V show that the preference estimates across the three 
measures of average test scores are quite similar. The specification in panel 1, using our 
base specification, has the highest likelihood value, and in this sense fits the choice data 
best. The value-added measure in Panel 4 does not fit the observed choice data well at all.  
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This may not be surprising since this statistic is not available to parents and is not easy to 
calculate given the available average score statistics. Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) 
report that high-demand schools in Chicago’s high school choice program tend to be 
schools with high average test scores, not high value-added. Note that our specifications 
using test score levels do allow parents to make a crude race-adjusted ‘value-added’ 
calculation when choosing a school (since these specifications separately control for 
racial makeup of the school).  
Overall, the results from Table V suggest that our preference estimates are not 
particularly sensitive to the use of reasonable alternative measures of school academic 
performance. Because our baseline specification provides the best fit of the data, we will 
rely on this specification for the final simulations. 
 
Strategy 
As noted above, parents may have had an incentive to misrepresent their true 
preferences. If they understood the allocation mechanism, a parent with an undesirable 
home school might want to hedge against being assigned to the home school. They would 
do so by picking less desirable schools than they actually prefer – trading off desirability 
for increased chance of being admitted. This strategy could make it appear that low-
income families (with lower-performing home schools) under-value academics even 
though they do not. They pick lower performing schools in order to increase their chance 
of admission, not because they place a lower weight on academics. However, it is not at 
all clear that parents had the information or experience in the first year of choice to 
understand how to exploit the incentives of the allocation mechanism. Parents did not 
know their lottery numbers or the assignment mechanism. In addition, parents were 
instructed by the district to list the schools they wanted on their choice form.
13  
We test for the presence of strategic behavior in the first year of choice by 
exploiting the redrawing of school boundaries. Many of those who lived in the same 
contiguous school assignment zone in 2001-02, were given different school assignments 
                                                 
13 This stands in contrast with other long-standing and limited choice programs, such as the Boston Public 
School choice program which told parents to consider carefully what schools they chose to list 
(Abdulkadiroglu et. al (2006)).  Abdulkadiroglu et. al (2006) also show that many parents appear to behave 
non-strategically in Boston Public Schools limited and long-standing school choice program, and that these 
parents would benefit most from strategizing on their first choice by picking a less popular school first.   
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in 2002-03. Hence, among those with the same school assignments who lived in the same 
neighborhood in 2001-02, some students experienced positive or negative shocks to the 
quality of their guaranteed school. Table VI shows the average difference for students 
who had positive versus negative shocks to their home school quality given that they 
lived in a 2001-2002 contiguous assignment zone that was split into new assignment 
zones. The table shows that the difference in scores was large and significant for many of 
the students affected by redistricting. If strategy was a major component of parental 
choices, we would expect to see very different choices for those with negative versus 
positive shocks to the quality of their home school, given a contiguous 2001-2002 school 
assignment zone. In particular, we should see significantly lower weight placed on 
average test scores for students who had a negative shock to the average quality of their 
home school. 
Table VII presents a simple conditional logit specification using the first choices 
for the sub-sample of students who lived in 2001-2002 assignment zones that were split 
by redistricting. The results are estimated on the sample of those students who had a 
positive shock and those that had a negative shock to their home school quality. Standard 
errors are clustered at the prior-year’s school assignment zone. The results show that 
there is no significant difference in the school-score preference estimates for redistricting 
losers versus winners.
14 In addition, the point estimates do not follow the expected 
pattern if strategy was a key component in choosing schools. Preferences for test scores 
are higher (in bold) as often as they are lower for the redistricting losers.  
Overall, we do not see evidence that parents with poorer home school 
assignments hedged their bets. It is possible that such strategic behavior may develop 
over time as parents became more familiar with the system.
15 Our evidence, suggests that 
                                                 
14 We also tested for differences in preferences using a reduced form regression of the average test score of 
the chosen school on the average test score at the home school, controlling for 2001-2002 school 
assignment fixed effects and student demographic information. This compares the average scores of 1
st 
choice schools within 2001-2002 assignment zones across students with positive and negative shocks to 
home school quality. We find no significant difference in the average scores of schools chosen across 
redistricting winners and losers.  
15 Evidence from laboratory experiments using simple extensive-form games between small numbers of 
players indicates that it takes time for players to learn how to play the game.  In games with incomplete 
information on other’s pay-offs, learning and convergence to the perfect equilibrium is slower and 
sometimes does not occur (Roth and Erev (1995)).  
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there is little evidence of hedging behavior in the first year of choice when parents most 
likely did not understand the allocation mechanism.  
 
Residential Sorting 
The exogenous redistricting of nearly half of the students in the district is also 
useful for testing the extent to which residential sorting affects our preference estimates. 
Residential sorting may lead us to overstate preferences for proximity if parents had 
already sorted to live next to the schools they prefer. What we interpret as a strong 
preference for proximity influencing school choice may actually be the opposite – strong 
preference for a school influencing proximity. Both redistricting and the multiple choices 
in our data will help identify preferences for proximity from preferences for other school 
characteristics.  
To test for the potential effects of residential sorting on our estimates, we re-
estimate our model for the sub-sample of students who were redistricted (whose school 
assignments under the bussing plan in 2001-2002 were different from their home school 
in 2002-2003).
 16 Table VIII provides summary statistics comparing the redistricted 
sample to the sample of students who were not redistricted. Because of the nature of the 
prior system of bussing, students who were redistricted were much more likely to be non-
white and eligible for lunch subsidies. (The busing plan often assigned students living in 
neighborhoods with large concentrations of minority students to attend school in 
neighborhoods with lower concentrations.)  But within the four demographic groups, the 
redistricted students looked similar to those who were not redistricted in terms of baseline 
test scores and median income. More interestingly, the redistricted students were much 
less likely to choose their home school or their last year’s school, and much more likely 
to list three choices. These facts are not necessarily evidence that redistricted students 
have less preference for their home school: Students who were not redistricted were more 
likely to have their home school be their last year’s school, making it very likely that they 
would choose that school. In contrast, redistricted children faced a less clear choice since 
their last year’s school was no longer their home school. 
                                                 
16 These students include both students who’s 2001-2002 school assignment zone was split into two new 
home school zones as well as those who’s entire 2001-2002 school assignment zone was reassigned to a 
new home school.  
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Table IX reports results from the mixed logit model estimated on the sample of 
students who were redistricted. The most striking feature of these estimates is their 
similarity to estimates from the full sample. Estimates of the mean and standard deviation 
of all the preference parameters are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. The mean of 
the parameter for home school is actually higher for all demographic groups in the 
redistricted sample, while the means for the distance and choice zone parameters are 
about equally likely to increase as decrease in the redistricted sample.  
Overall, these estimates suggest that endogenous residential location is not a 
major source of bias in this data. In addition, the similarity of the results is not too 
surprising if we believe our model is using the information in multiple choices to identify 
preferences. Recall from Table I that a substantial fraction of parents who listed their 
home school as their first choice also listed subsequent choices. For these parents, 
multiple choices simulate redistricting whether or not they were actually redistricted.  
 
Other Robustness Checks 
  A range of alternative specifications yielded similar quantitative and qualitative 
results. We have pooled elementary and middle school students for simplicity, but 
estimating the model separately for elementary and middle schools yielded similar 
parameter estimates. As already mentioned, we experimented with alternative 
specifications for the racial composition of the school, including dummy variables and 
splines in percent black. The spline estimates were very consistent with the more 
parsimonious quadratic specification.  
We also specified distance to each school in terms of driving time (based on 
expected speed on each class of road) rather than driving distance, yielding nearly 
identical results. In addition, estimations using splines in distance indicated that the linear 
functional form used in our model was appropriate. We experimented with a range of 
alternative proxies for academic quality of a school. Using closely related measures such 
as the average percentile score resulted in nearly identical estimates. Allowing for non-
linearities in the effect of school scores, through a quadratic or spline term, did not 
change the qualitative implications of the parameter estimates. However these models fit 
the data poorly in the tails of the distribution, and for this mechanical reason they  
  27
generated implausible results when used in simulations. In addition, estimates using 
splines in school test scores indicated that the linear model fit the data well for most 
segments of the population. Including separate terms for the school average test scores of 
whites and non-whites separately resulted in all students, both white and non-white, 
placing similar weights on the two scores, with both racial groups placing a larger weight 
on white test score performance. Again, the implications of the results were unchanged 
across these specifications. Finally, including a separate dummy variable for schools that 
were academic magnets (e.g. International Baccalaureate, Math and Science magnets) 
reduced the mean coefficient on school test scores about in half. This result highlights 
that average test scores are a proxy for the academic focus of a school, and not 
necessarily the sole causal factor driving demand. 
Finally, when we estimated a general mixed-logit model with full covariance 
terms for the parameters, we found that some covariance terms became unstable in some 
specifications. For example, when we included a covariance between racial preferences 
and preferences for other characteristics could often be unstable, yielding corner solutions 
in some circumstances. However, the means and standard deviations of the preference 
parameters were largely unchanged, and the implications of the estimates in the demand 
simulations were very similar. This suggests that some of the covariance terms are poorly 




In the discussion of the results above, we focused primarily on the mean weight 
attached to various school attributes. However, the aggregate response to any policy 
change will depend not only on the mean parameter estimate, but also on the variance or 
distribution of that parameter in the population. As noted in the introduction, a key issue 
in the policy debate over school choice is the elasticity of demand with respect to school 
test scores. In order to shed some light on this question, we took each school individually, 
added .33 average student-level standard deviations to its mean school score holding all 
else equal, and simulated the change in the number of students listing that school as a  
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first choice.
17 The simulated change in demand was a local approximation (based on the 
derivative of demand), so these simulations should be interpreted as the impact of a small 
change in school test scores. 
Figures 2a and 2b plot the change in number of students listing a school as a first 
choice by the school’s original average score (each point in the figure is the result of a 
simulation for a different school: 2a plots elementary schools, 2b middle schools). 
Because of the difference in size, we plot the results separately for elementary and middle 
schools. The demand response is quite different for schools that were originally high and 
low-scoring. The upward sloping relationship implies that the demand response is 
greatest among schools that were already high scoring. This result reflects the parameter 
estimates in the mixed logit model. Parents with high preferences for school scores, and 
thus low preferences for their neighborhood school, are sensitive to changes in school 
scores and willing to consider schools over a relatively broad geography. These parents 
are both likely to only consider high scoring schools for their children and willing to 
change schools in response to an increase in score at another high scoring school, even 
one that is located further away. These results imply that the incentives to focus on 
student performance are larger for higher performing schools, since schools above a 
critical performance level compete intensely on academic quality for the quality-elastic 
segment of the population.  
Figures 3 and 4 plot differences in mean characteristics between the marginal 
students (those who are drawn in by the .33 average student-level standard deviation 
score increase) and students who previously enrolled in each school. The incentive for 
any school to improve its performance would be dampened if, in doing so, they were 
swamped by lower-performing and or lower-income students, who would bring down 
mean performance and potentially be more costly to educate. Figure 3 compares marginal 
and average students in the percentage receiving lunch subsidies; Figure 4 compares 
mean test scores for the marginal and average student. The points below the 45° degree 
line in the Figure 3 indicate schools where a lower proportion of the marginal students 
received lunch subsidies than the average student. It is evident in graph that the marginal 
                                                 
17 This is approximately equivalent to a 10 point increase in the average percentile score for students 
attending that school.   
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students had lower rates of lunch subsidy receipt than the students already enrolled. In 
other words, the marginal students were more affluent than the students already enrolled 
in most schools. Figure 4 reports differences in mean test score between the marginal 
student and the average student previously enrolled in the school. The fact that most 
points were above the 45° line implies that the marginal students, on average, were higher 
performing than the students already enrolled.  
The key features of the simulations reported in Figures 2-4 appear to be driven 
primarily by the estimated heterogeneity in preferences, rather than other details of the 
specification. In all the alternative specifications we have estimated that allowed for 
heterogeneity in preferences, we found that an increase in school test scores had a much 
larger effect on demand in high scoring schools, and attracted higher-performing and 
higher-income students to the school (particularly at low scoring schools). Eliminating 
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences (estimating a conditional logit) reduces the 
simulated difference in demand response to higher performing schools by roughly 15%. 
Eliminating preference heterogeneity through observable characteristics (income, race, 
lunch-subsidy status and baseline test scores) further decreases the difference in demand 
response across high and low performing schools, leading to a low demand response 
across all schools. Thus, heterogeneity in preferences appears to be a key element in 
understanding the properties of parental demand for schools and their implications for 
student sorting and demand-side pressures for school quality in a public school choice 
program.  
The implications of these simulations are very interesting for school choice policy 
design. On one hand, they suggest that the absolute enrollment responses to 
improvements in performance are small at schools that start out low-performing. The 
enrollment responses are much larger at schools that start out higher performing - 
suggesting that demand-side forces may lean toward greater vertical separation on test 
scores. In the long run, the new equilibrium will depend on the incentives provided to 
school managers and steps districts can take to influence demand for school quality 
particularly among low-income households. If a greater percentage of resources are 
directed towards high demand and high performance schools, top tier schools will have 
strong incentives to improve student performance, while lower-tier schools may not.  
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However, district policies that commit to close schools or replace principals in schools 
with shrinking enrollments coupled with financial incentives for performance may 
minimize the degree of vertical separation. For example, North Carolina has provided 
bonuses to teachers in schools with test score improvements and, with the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001, the federal government has required states to penalize schools with 
poor test performance. Moreover, the district has replaced principles at schools with low 
enrollments and moved to close and reorganize schools at the lowest end of performance 
(and enrollment). In addition, marketing and outreach efforts that increase the choice 
responsiveness of low-income and minority families to academic achievement may 
increase the pressure on all schools to provide quality education under public school 




This paper used a school choice policy experiment and detailed student-level data 
to examine parental preferences for key school characteristics. We employed a mixed 
logit demand estimation approach which allowed parents’ preferences to vary with 
observable characteristics as well as idiosyncratically. We show that preferences for 
measures of academic achievement are increasing in income and baseline academic 
ability. In addition, parents who have a low idiosyncratic preference for their 
neighborhood school have a higher idiosyncratic preference for school test scores.  
The distribution of preferences has important implications for school choice. 
Simulations based on our preference estimates indicate disparate demand-side pressure 
for schools to improve academic performance. High performing schools serve families 
who value academics, and receive a large demand response to increases in average test 
scores. Consumers of low-performing schools are local families who are less responsive 
to changes in school academic performance. These ‘local monopolist’ schools face little 
demand-side pressure to improve and serve, on average, families with lower income and 
lower baseline academic achievement. 
By using unique data and a large school-choice policy experiment, we were able 
to take a demand-estimation approach to understanding competition in a school choice  
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program. This approach has several benefits. First, it contrasts with prior approaches 
which use HHI’s to measure competition in the market for schools and predict the effects 
on achievement of increased parental choice. In a differentiated products market, 
preferences play a key role in determining demand and competition. By estimating 
preferences we can examine models of consumer choice implicitly excluded by models 
relying on HHI’s and similar measures of market concentration. Secondly, understanding 
preferences can elucidate policy measures that may increase competition in a school 
choice program. For example, school districts may design information systems, school 
choice guides, or counseling resources to increase the value that low-income families 
place on academic performance. Districts may also use demand-response as a basis for 
school closure and reorganization decisions, adding powerful supply-side pressure to 
school administrators. Preference estimates can also be used to examine placement of 
new schools for maximal impact on competitive pressure. Furthermore, preferences may 
assist in theoretical simulations of expanded choice plans and alternative assignment 
mechanisms. Finally, the gains to students from exercising choice are likely to depend on 
parents’ objectives when choosing schools, and heterogeneity in preferences may explain 
disparate impacts of school choice on student academic achievement (Hastings, Kane, 
and Staiger, 2006). Thus, preferences drive parental (consumer) choice, and their 
distribution in the population affects competition, sorting, and gains to academic 
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  White Black White Black 
Student Characteristics    
   Average Test score  0.6384 -0.0905 -0.0851 -0.6128 
     (St. Dev.)  (0.8249) (0.8395) (0.8480) (0.7996) 
   Neighborhood Income  73,812 50,635 52,734 36,459 
     (St. Dev.)  (25,866) (21,506) (22,329) (16,241) 
     
Choice Characteristics     
   Percent Listed 1st Choice Only  0.5123 0.2768 0.3311 0.2065 
   Percent Listed 2 Choices  0.1985 0.1778 0.2057 0.1664 
   Percent Listed 3 Choices  0.2892 0.5454 0.4631 0.6271 
   Percent Chose Home School 1st  0.6443  0.4251 0.514 0.3827 
    
Student-Choice Characteristics    
Home School Average Test Score  0.2131 -0.1864 -0.1711 -0.3919 
     (St. Dev.)  (0.4035) (0.3613) (0.3739) (0.3247) 
Distance to Nearest School in the 
  Top Quartile  2.5664 2.6616 2.4523 2.1272 



















Figure 1a: Thematic Map of Charlotte Mecklenburg County with Census Block 
Groups by Race and School Location by Average Test Score  
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 Table II: Explanatory Variable Definitions  




Driving distance from student i to school j calculated using 





Average of the 2001-2002 student-level standardized scale score 
for End of Grade Math and Reading exams for students in school 
j in the 2002-2003 school year. This is the average test score 






The sum of student i's scale score on End of Grade math and  
reading exams in baseline year 2001-2002 standardized by the 
mean and standard deviation of district-wide scores for students 






The median household income reported in the 2000 Census for 
households of student i's race in student i's block group. Income 
is demeaned by the county-wide average of approximately 




The percent of students in school j who are black according to 





Table III: Explanatory Variable Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics Using First Choice Data    
Variable  Obs.   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Distance  2342254 13.0151 6.7548 0.0010 42.4069
Last-year School  2342254 0.0149 0.1213 0.0000 1.0000
School Score  2342254 -0.1120 0.4531 -0.9427 1.9410
Test score  2342254 0.0559 0.9885 -2.9113 3.0255
Test score*School-Score  2342254 -0.0035 0.4633 -2.7013 5.8724
Income  2342254 5.0913 27.5661 -48.5010 149.0010
Income*School-Score  2342254 -0.5635 13.0757 -140.4703 251.7595


































    
Distance** Mean  (lognormal)  -0.3464 -0.2707 -0.3655 -0.2814
 
Std. Dev. 
(lognormal)  0.0623 0.0412 0.1007 0.0620
Last-year 
School Mean  3.8770 3.5848 3.5790 2.9589
 Std.  Dev. 2.5569 2.9919 3.4261 3.5589
Home School  Mean  2.0558 1.7103 1.9302 1.7441
 Std.  Dev. -0.8081 0.0691 -0.7966 -1.2545
Choice Zone  Mean  1.2648 1.3015 1.9021 1.5866
 Std.  Dev. 0.8838 1.2214 1.4936 1.2084
School Score  Mean  1.6627 2.3404 0.6504 1.2669
 Std.  Dev. 0.2530 0.2810 0.6478 0.3474
Test score * 
School Score  Mean  0.4752 0.3981 0.2888 0.3438
 Std.  Dev.  -- --  -- -- 
Income*School 
Score  Mean  0.0139 0.0139 -- -- 
 Std.  Dev.  -- --  -- -- 
Percent Black   Mean  3.7166 5.8296 2.3117 3.4708
 Std.  Dev. 2.8234 1.8174 2.2885 1.1362
Percent Black 
Squared  Mean  -5.2588 -3.6604 -3.6392 -2.2540
 Std.  Dev.  -- --  -- -- 
    
Implied Mean Preferred % Black  0.3534 0.7963 0.3176 0.7699
 Std.  Dev. 0.2684 0.2483 0.3144 0.2520
   
Estimated Correlation Coefficients:   
    Corr(Distance, School Score)  0.5808 -0.3273 0.4585 -0.6747
    Corr(Distance, Home School)  0.1041 0.0006 -0.1935 -0.1061
    Corr(School Score, Home School)  -0.1727 -0.9424 -0.8235 -0.3731
    
* All estimates are significant at the 1% level or higher   









Table V: Comparing Alternative Measures of School Academic Achievement 
    






Parameter  White     Black  White   Black 
Score Measure: Spring 2002 scores of student in school in Spring 
2003    
   - log likelihood   41311.12 32954.29 9241.04  80209.13
 School  Score  Mean  1.6627 2.3404 0.6504 1.2669
   St.  Dev.  0.2530 0.2810 0.6478 0.3474
 
Test score * School 
Score  Mean  0.4752 0.3981 0.2888 0.3438
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
  Income* School Score  Mean  0.0139 0.0139 -- -- 
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
Score Measure: Spring 2003 scores of student in school in Spring 
2003    
   - log likelihood    41458.57 33201.53 9246.13 80402.94
 School  Score  Mean  1.3855 1.9640 0.5656 1.0616
   St.  Dev.  0.4259 0.2421 0.6985 0.3867
 
Test score * School 
Score Mean  0.4852 0.4415 0.2763 0.3233
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
  Income* School Score  Mean  0.0136 0.0119 -- -- 
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
Score Measure: Spring 2002 scores of student in school in Spring 
2002    
   - log likelihood   41809.18 33758.23 9306.37  80777.08
 School  Score  Mean  0.9107 1.0208 0.4068 0.4837
   St.  Dev.  0.5060 0.0914 0.6163 0.4471
 
Test score * School 
Score Mean  0.4824 0.4586 0.2641 0.3057
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
  Income* School Score  Mean  0.0096 0.0085 -- -- 
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
Value Added: Average regression adjusted gains in test scores from 2002-2003*   
   - log likelihood   42452.06 34120.71 9286.52  80858.73
 School  Score  Mean  -1.0668 -0.5114 -0.7711 -0.7896
   St.  Dev.  1.4638 0.5670 0.9681 0.8189
 
Test score * School 
Score  Mean  1.5659 1.3402 0.2098 0.2062
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
  Income* School Score  Mean  0.0161 -0.0047 -- -- 
   St.  Dev.  --  -- -- -- 
           
*Value Added calculated as school fixed effects in a regression of 2003 standardized test scores on 2002 standardized 
scores, controlling for student characteristics such as race, lunch recipient status and grade level. Empirical Bayes 
measures of Value added were calculated and were correlated with Value-added 0.95.  




Table VI: Differences in Scores Across Redistricted Polygons 
Average Difference in 2002-2003 Home School Scores within a 
Given 2001-2002 School Assignment Polygon 
   Mean  Stdev 
White  0.2925 0.3165  Not Receiving 
Lunch Subsidies  Not white  0.2570 0.2552 
White  0.2891 0.2836  Receiving Lunch 
Subsidies Not  white  0.2866 0.3111 
 
 
Table VII: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Conditional Logit Estimates of 
Preferences for Academics Across Redistricting Winners and Losers 





White  Not Receiving Lunch Subsidies    
   School Score  2.5224 2.2739
     (0.4593) (0.3498)
  
Test score * 
School Score  0.1345 0.4714
     (0.1210) (0.1388)
  
Income* 
School Score  -0.0022 0.0137
     (0.0080) (0.0115)
    Joint Test P-Value:  0.23
Not-White  Not Receiving Lunch Subsidies    
   School  Score  2.6227 3.0614
     (0.1449) (0.1470)
  
Test score * 
School Score  0.3625 0.4712
     (0.1051) (0.1009)
  
Income* 
School Score  0.0144 0.0205
     (0.0053) (0.0045)
    Joint Test P-Value:  0.15
White  Receiving Lunch Subsidies    
   School  Score  0.8037 1.4041
     (0.3939) (0.3720)
  
Test score * 
School Score  0.7460 0.1472
     (0.2027) (0.2408)
    Joint Test P-Value:  0.13
Not-White  Receiving Lunch Subsidies    
   School  Score  1.4594 1.3982
     (0.1510) (0.1993)
  
Test score * 
School Score  0.4731 0.4189
     (0.0858) (0.0849)
   Joint Test P-Value: 0.83
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Table VIII: Summary Statistics Comparing Redistricted and Non Redistricted Students 
  Overall  No Lunch Subsidies  Lunch Subsidies 













Non-Lunch  0.5419  0.2892              
%White, Lunch  0.0674  0.0461              
%Non-White, 
Non-Lunch  0.1569  0.1903              
%Non-White, 
Lunch  0.2338  0.4744              
Median Income  61,311 48,267  73,325  71,564  52,132  48,523  41,770 33,647 41,770 33,647 
Average  
Z-Score  0.2215 -0.1870  0.6486  0.5747  -0.0344  -0.1540  -0.5144 -0.6720 -0.5144 -0.6720 
Percent Chose 




0.6609 0.4042  0.7196  0.4692  0.6141  0.4264  0.5557 0.3507 0.5557 0.3507 
Percent Made 3 
Choices  0.3872 0.5814  0.2551  0.3727  0.5100  0.6057  0.6025 0.7019 0.6025 0.7019 
Score of New 
Home School  0.0119 -0.2410  0.2065  0.1224  -0.1511  -0.2552  -0.2884 -0.4557 -0.2884 -0.4557 
Score of Old 






























    
Distance** Mean  (lognormal)  -0.3763 -0.2745 -0.3061 -0.2801
 
Std. Dev. 
(lognormal)  0.0661 0.0408 0.0395 0.0589
Last-year 
School Mean  3.5422 3.4251 3.5870 3.0111
 Std.  Dev. 2.3087 2.8449 2.8059 3.4437
Home School  Mean  2.3071 1.8390 2.0496 1.8338
 Std.  Dev. 0.8174 1.1331 1.5804 1.5533
Choice Zone  Mean  1.1425 1.3133 1.7984 1.6011
 Std.  Dev. 0.7629 1.0372 1.2424 0.9999
School Score  Mean  1.5587 2.4388 0.3785 1.1470
 Std.  Dev. 0.4442 0.5068 0.4040 0.6688
Test score * 
School Score  Mean  0.5371 0.4270 0.0928 0.3071
 Std.  Dev.  -- --  -- -- 
Income*School 
Score  Mean  0.0196 0.0197 -- -- 
 Std.  Dev.  -- --  -- -- 
Percent Black   Mean  3.5729 5.5543 0.9015 2.3149
 Std.  Dev. 2.8769 1.8569 1.8622 0.7953
Percent Black 
Squared  Mean  -5.2151 -3.4869 -2.5284 -1.4146
 Std.  Dev.  -- --  -- -- 
    
Implied Mean Preferred % Black  0.3426 0.7965 0.1783 0.8182
 Std.  Dev. 0.2758 0.2663 0.3683 0.2811
   
Estimated Correlation Coefficients:   
       Corr(Distance, School Score)  0.3951 -0.3571 0.5111 -0.6070
       Corr(Distance, Home School)  0.1344 -0.0063 -0.1847 -0.1083
       Corr(School Score, Home School)  -0.6297 -0.7740 -0.7727 -0.4230
    
* All estimates are significant at the 1% level or higher   




Figure 2a: Elementary Schools: Simulated Change in Number of Students Choosing 






























Figure 2b: Middle Schools: Simulated Change in Number of Students Choosing 










































Figure 3: Percent of the Additional Students who Choose School j in Response to a 
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Figure 4: Average 2002 St.Dev Scale Score for the Additional Students who Choose 
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APPENDIX TABLES:  
 
Table A.I: Standard Errors for Parameter Estimates in Table IV  
   No Lunch Subsidies  Lunch Subsidies 
   White Black White Black 
    
Standard Errors on Mean Preferences    
  Distance  0.0002485 0.0000020 0.0000055 0.0000021
  Last-year School   0.0003436 0.0000015 0.0000059 0.0000291
  Home School   0.0002006 0.0000394 0.0000194 0.0000280
  Choice Zone  0.0006687 0.0000019 0.0000040 0.0000211
  School Score  0.0012939 0.0000888 0.0000192 0.0000704
  Test score * School Score  0.0004424 0.0000018 0.0000190 0.0000543
  Income*School Score  0.0000521 0.0000003 -- -- 
  Percent Black   0.0357668 0.0002074 0.0003098 0.0007694
  Percent Black Squared  0.0378734 0.0000378 0.0002692 0.0006274
    
Standard Errors on Standard Deviations    
  Distance  0.0000359 0.0000093 0.0000049 0.0000005
  Last-year School   0.0001151 0.0001092 0.0000413 0.0000178
  Home School   0.0004402 0.0000702 0.0000112 0.0000530
  Choice Zone  0.0023968 0.0000583 0.0000124 0.0000459
  School Score  0.0008831 0.0000249 0.0000140 0.0000272
  Percent Black   0.0084486 0.0000289 0.0001043 0.0002395
    
Standard Errors on Correlation Coefficients    
  Corr(Dist., Score)  0.0000613 0.0003647 0.0000121 0.0002664
  Corr(Dist., Home Schl.)  0.0000817 0.0001029 0.0000046 0.0000073
  Corr(Score, Home Schl.)  0.0051998 0.0000999 0.0000125 0.0001219
 
 
 
 
 